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No One Polity Saturates the Political Space in
a Given Territory
n Sylvia Walby
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Introduction
Bruce and Voas (2004) and I are in agreement about the importance of debat-
ing the usefulness of the concept of the nation-state for sociology. Our dis-
agreement is over the theorization of polities, rather than the empirical evidence
relating to the significance of religion. I am pleased to have the opportunity to
clarify misunderstandings and to push forward this important debate.
My argument is that the diversity of types of polity in the contemporary
world needs to be more fully appreciated and their inter-relations more subtly
theorized. In particular, I argue that it is rare for just one polity to saturate the
political space in a given territory. The typical approach, via the concept of the
nation-state (e.g. Giddens, 1984), conflates important distinctions (especially
between ‘nation’, ‘state’ and ‘nation-state’) and leaves out of focus points of dis-
juncture between these entities that are important in generating social and polit-
ical struggle and change (e.g. stateless nations seeking a state of their own).
No One Polity Politically Saturates a Given Territory
Bruce and Voas (2004) defend the view that nation-states are about politics and
religions about religion. My argument is that both are sub-types of polities and
that they overlap within the same terrain, that of the governance of social rela-
tions. It is rare for one polity to politically saturate any given territory. No one
polity controls all possible political niches and domains. Rather, polities vari-
ously cooperate, compete, fight and accommodate each other. And they overlap
in the same territory.
The Weberian conception of the modern state as an entity that controls
legitimate coercion in a given territory is inadequate to grasp the nature of
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contemporary politics. There are more bases of governance than coercion.
There are more types of polity than states. There is more than one polity in a
given territory. The notion of a monopoly of political control must give way in
the face of the evidence. The exceptions to the conventional notion of political
monopoly constitute the norm, not the exception. Sociology should recognize
the lack of monopoly; that no one polity politically saturates a given territory.
It is in the tension between different overlapping polities within the same terri-
tory that many important sociological issues are located.
Bruce and Voas hold a zero-sum conception of power. This is fundamental
to their argument that only if a religion were found to ‘weaken’ or ‘threaten’ or
‘rival’ a nation-state, could it be found that there were significant polities other
than nation-states. My argument rejects such a zero-sum conception of power.
The co-existing polities may support each other as well as be in opposition; they
may be in a symbiotic relationship, even if unequal. Zero-sum conceptions of
power are too simple to grasp the complexity of the relations between contem-
porary polities. Overlapping polities may co-operate as well as compete.
Bruce and Voas claim that ‘a major portion of Walby’s article is devoted to
the claim that organized religion can be a polity and hence rival the state.’ This
is a misunderstanding of my argument. The term ‘rival’ lies at the heart of the
matter. I do not think that religions have to rival states in order to constitute a
polity. Organized forms of religion can constitute sources of governance in their
own right, whatever their relationship with a state with which it co-exists in the
same territory. Whether the relations between religions and states are co-
operative or competitive does not affect my argument. Bruce and Voas devote
half their article to a whirlwind tour of the world’s religions in a misguided
attempt at a rebuttal of a misunderstanding. (Indeed only two pages of my
article concerned religion.)
More Nations Than States
Bruce and Voas do not offer a definition of ‘nation-state’, nor of ‘nation’, nor
of ‘state’. They do not explicitly reject my definitions of these concepts that I
presented (Walby, 2003). Rather, they implicitly use different definitions. It is
hard to discuss their formulations since they do not define them.
I define a polity as a form of governance involving one or more of a series
of forms of power including coercion, economic, legal and symbolic forms that
are coordinated in a range of ways, which is significant over a range of institu-
tions and commands deference. Key to my definition of a polity is that it con-
stitutes a form of governance, not that it has a monopoly of governance. There
are more sources of the power used for governance than that of coercion. My
examples of polities included empires, states, nations, the European Union and
some organized religions. Thus it is not accurate for Bruce and Voas to claim
that my only examples of non-state polities are the European Union and orga-
nized religion. States are usually polities and have the full range of powers asso-
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ciated with governance. Nations are polities where they have a set of governing
institutions that are able to command deference, although some nations are not
so developed. Organized religions are polities when they have a set of govern-
ing institutions that command deference. Religion is not only a ‘potent source
of values’ but also a form of governance. Empires have one key state and usu-
ally many nations.
I define a nation-state as an entity in which there is one nation, the whole
of that nation and no other nation, and one state, the whole of that state and
only that state co-existing in the same territory. It is a mistake to conflate ‘state’
and ‘nation’ within the concept ‘nation-state’. This conflation hides more than
it reveals, airbrushing away major sources of social and political tension.
I made the claim that while states were common polities, nation-states were
rare. A key part of the evidential basis of this claim is that there are more
nations than states, and that many entities that are superficially thought to be
nation-states are, on closer examination, found not to be.
Bruce and Voas do not systematically address my critique of the conflation
of nation and state in the concept of nation-state. They make the claim:
‘Nations exist; states exist: very often they coincide.’ This is followed by a list
of examples ‘e.g. in much of Latin America and in some of Africa’ and ‘Citizens
of Ghana are quite clear about being Ghanaians.’ No texts are cited as evidence
for these claims. Further, they claim ‘elites in these countries… do not typically
find the idea of the nation-state an irrelevance’, however, this is not evidence
contradicting my claim that there are more nations than states.
I provided examples from the UK to illustrate the existence of more nations
than states; that is, in the UK there is one state and several nations or parts of
nations. Do Bruce and Voas think that the Scottish are not a nation? Do they
think that McCrone (1992) is wrong to describe Scotland as a ‘stateless nation’?
Or that there is not an Irish nation? Do they think these nations are irrelevant?
Is the social and political strife over the location of the border between Ireland
and the UK really of such little consequence? Or the struggle for a national par-
liament for Scotland? Do they really think that these nations are merging into
one British nation, since Bruce and Voas state ‘In those instances where at the
outset they [nations and states] did not [coincide], there is a tendency for
nation-states to emerge’?
My argument is that the disjuncture between the boundaries of nations and
the state in the UK is sociologically significant. Nations have contested the
boundaries and nature of the UK state with tremendous consequences, from ter-
rorism and militarization of Northern Ireland, to upheaval in parliamentary
institutions, to the differential regulation of education and health care.
Disaggregating ‘nation’ and ‘state’ can be more helpful for sociological analysis
than conflating them in a spurious unity of ‘nation-state’.
The UK is not the only pluri-national state. Keating (2002) describes four
such examples in the developed world – the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium
and Canada – as well as the European Union.
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Empires have historically been important examples of polities that were not
nation-states. For example, in the British Empire there were many nations, but
only one state. The claim that Bruce and Voas make about the British Empire
and ‘the nation-state that controlled it’ not being the same entity misses the
point, which is that a large number of the world’s peoples did not live in a
nation-state when they lived within the British Empire. These nations did not
have a state of their own. Many millions did not live in a nation-state of their
own, but in an Empire controlled by the British state.
Over 300 developed or emerging national groups worldwide are detailed in
the 2432 page book by Minahan (2002) on stateless nations. Cohen (1997) esti-
mates that there are around 2000 ‘nation-peoples’, around ten times as many
as the states that are recognized by the United Nations. Europe is criss-crossed
with nations and many would-be nations, overlapping but not perfectly aligned
with states (Boje et al., 1999; Brubaker, 1996; Therborn, 1995). There are
many more nations than states. There is no evidential basis to the claim that
nations and states ‘very often... coincide’ in the contemporary world.
The conflation of nation and state in nation-state prevents sociology from
understanding the nature of governance in the modern world. This conflation
should be rejected and replaced by a more nuanced appreciation of the diverse
forms taken by polities.
Not Nested Hierarchies
Bruce and Voas claim that polities usually exist in nested hierarchies, in which
the higher level determines the powers that can be exercised by the lower level.
While nested hierarchies often exist in federal political systems, they rarely exist
in relationships between other polities, such as those between the Member
States and the European Union, and those between states and religions. The
federal USA is an inadequate analogy or template for understanding relations
between most polities.
In particular, Bruce and Voas seem to misunderstand the nature of the
European Union. They underestimate the power of European level. They do not
appreciate the complex distribution of powers between the Member States and
the various EU institutions, especially the Commission, Council, Parliament
and Court. In some of these institutions, such as the Council, the Member
States have greater individual voice, while in others, such as the European
Court of Justice, they have little (European Commission, 2003; Weiler, 1997).
Further in different domains the relative powers of the Member States and the
EU varies, being greater for the EU in issues of economic governance and
greater for the Member States in law and order (Hoskyns, 1996; Supiot, 2001).
There is no overall nested hierarchy in which either the Member States or the
EU is pre-eminent. Bruce and Voas claim that states have ‘simply agreed to
adopt certain results of deliberation within European institutions as part of its
own policy’. But this does not provide an adequate account of the nature of the
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decision making processes since Member States can and are taken to the
European Court of Justice by the European Commission if their domestic poli-
cies are found to fall short of EU requirements. It is not merely in ‘unusual sit-
uations’ that ‘individuals may have avenues to appeal over the heads of their
national governments’, but in all instances where the EU has passed a legally
binding Directive. Indeed national courts are bound to follow EU law where it
exists in priority to their own domestic law. The EU is not a simple multi-level
political entity, since it is only in some domains that the powers of the EU are
superior to those of its Member States, not all.
The example of the regulation of the quality of Danish beer is used by
Bruce and Voas to trivialize the nature and extent of EU regulation. It is not
only control over their beer that the Danes have ceded to the EU, but the power
to regulate many aspects of the Danish economy, from employment regulation
to trade negotiations. The loss of the power to regulate their economy is a sig-
nificant transfer of power and not a trivial one. It calls into question the extent
of the capacities for autonomous action of Member States, which are tradi-
tionally assumed to be an intrinsic part of the political capabilities of a nation-
state.
The powers of the Member States and the EU are not a zero sum game. The
EU enables Member States to achieve economic goals, for growth and develop-
ment, which they would be unlikely to accomplish if they had remained apart
(Milward, 1992). It is by giving up some forms of power that these political
goals have been accomplished. Again, the complexity of the diverse new forms
of polities needs to be recognized, not denied, if it is to be adequately grasped
and understood.
Likewise, the relationship between religion and states is rarely a zero-sum
game, nor is it a nested hierarchy. Rather, there are complex interactions,
mutual adaptations, overlaps, and changes in the extent to which particular
policy domains are within one or the other. The reconfiguration of the bound-
aries of Protestant Churches and states concerning both territory and remit dur-
ing the reformation were complex struggles and mutual adaptations (Gorski,
2000). The policy domains that may variously be within the remit of a religion
or a state include not only personal life (Helie-Lucas, 1994) but also other
areas, such as the negotiation of the acceptability of usury between Islam and
developing states (Economist, 2001).
The Power of Myth
Bruce and Voas misunderstand my position. I never say that the idea of the
nation-state is irrelevant. I never say that there is not pressure to become a
nation-state. Myths are powerful. Ideas move people to action. Invented tradi-
tions have effects (Hobsbawn and Ranger, 1983). A myth is a narrative story
that is considered to represent a tradition and to provide information about
core values and the conduct necessary to achieve them.
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The myth of the nation-state is that a nation will find full and true expres-
sion of its values and secure its economic well-being only if it has a state of its
own in a territory of its own; and that it is possible to achieve this, evidence for
this being that there are believed to be many examples of successful nation-
states. It is predicated on the assumption that it is possible and desirable to
bring into alignment in one place, culture, economy, and political representa-
tion through a state.
The myth of the nation-state is a very powerful force. It does not depend
upon there being any actually existing nation-states, only a belief that there are.
Many national movements believe that it is possible as well as desirable to
achieve a nation-state. The myth of the nation-state has launched many politi-
cal movements and militarized conflicts.
The nation-state is a powerful myth about purity. It is about a nation hav-
ing a state of its own so that it can self-regulate its environment in conformity
with its values. The nation-state myth is about the close fit of a nation and its
own state, with its own politics, economy, and culture mapping onto one
another in the same territory.
The desire of a nation, or would-be nation, for a state of its own is a
tremendous force in human history. On the one hand it can be understood in
terms of a discourse of self-determination, of community, of democracy, of the
realization of a society in conformity with the values of the nation, free from
the impositions of invasive, colonialist, exploitative, foreign powers. On the
other hand it is also a terrible force. It can unleash militarism and armed strug-
gle, by regular armies, guerrillas and terrorists, as nations seek to establish a
state of their own in a territory of their own. It can be a force that seeks purity
where there is none, driving genocide, ethnic cleansing, communal murders,
and pogroms.
Bruce and Voas (2004) produce sketches of world religions as stable
bounded groups of people at peace with the states and world in which they live.
There is little reference to the complexity of the partial overlap with nations,
states, and other religions and the ensuing tensions.
My view is that many contemporary militarized conflicts have as a key ele-
ment a contestation over the non-overlap between nation and state and terri-
tory, which are compounded when religion is involved. The Middle East has
two nations, Israelis and Palestinians, seeking to form their own states in partly
the same territory. The tension between India and Pakistan stems from the lack
of neat overlap of nation, religion and state in their border regions, never
resolved at their independence from the British Empire. Northern Ireland has
two nations in one territory seeking alignments with two different states. The
Balkans war involved the non-alignment of nation, religion and state.
The European Union was founded in the aftermath of bloody conflicts over
nation and state. Its founders explicitly sought to eradicate the origins of the
many wars in Europe in nationalism, by proposing a new kind of polity that
diffused national sentiment (Hallstein, 1973; Walby, 1999). They were correct
in their analysis and successful in their achievement. The EU is the leading
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example of a post-national constellation (Habermas, 2001), or a network state
(Castells, 1998).
Conclusions
The political world is better analysed by differentiating between different types
of polities than using a ‘one-size fits all’ approach and squeezing them into
nation-states. There are nations, states, religions, the EU, and empires.
Coercion is only one of the forms of power that polities utilize to underpin gov-
ernance. The EU does not have a military arm, yet is still a powerful polity.
Polities and other domains such as culture and economy do not often map
neatly onto one another in the same territory. Rather they are likely to have dif-
ferent spatial and temporal reach (Walby, 2005 forthcoming). The tension that
is a consequence of their lack of fit is a major force for social struggle and
change.
The nation-state is a powerful and resilient myth. The aspiration of nations
for a state of their own is a powerful driving force in contemporary politics.
However, they seldom achieve a state just for themselves and usually have to
settle for some sort of messy compromise with other nations and polities. If it
were known just how few nation-states are actually achieved, perhaps the pur-
suit of some nations for a state of their own might be less ferocious.
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